...land, which he says is "alienating, expensive and time-consuming," stakeholders and MDOT jointly developed an approach to align their various interests. Creating a draft scope of work that local planning agencies and stakeholders could modify played a big role.

"It’s important because as a DOT, we can be seen as an 800-lb gorilla," Bottigheimer says. Once a distinct plan is formed with full consensus, the requests for development proposals must then compete based on value, not on offering new concepts, thus creating more cost-competitiveness.

"Why is a DOT doing this?" asks Bottigheimer. "It’s an important part of a broader strategy. We want to preserve the capacity of our highways while improving quality of life." New Jersey and Pennsylvania are following suit. "If we were to follow a traditional congestion growth anticipation model" and simply widen roads, "it would be financially infeasible–it’s unsustainable growth," says Gary Toth, NJDOT director of project planning and development.

Downtown Train. Light rail is a growing urban factor. (Photo courtesy of Washington Group International )

As the future of mass transit takes shape in the U.S., the menu of modes is expanding. Light rail and commuter rail can help spur TOD regionally, while on a smaller scale trolleys and streetcars can enhance it. Charlie Hales, transit planning principal with HDR, Omaha, calls the resurging popularity of trolleys and streetcars for downtown cores a "phenomenon," ranging from Portland, Miami and Atlanta to Omaha, Tucson and Little Rock. In Miami, streetcars will serve a three-mile corridor where 25,000 housing units are planned.

Many cities also like the lower-cost, lower-risk option of bus rapid transit. "It’s not always the best answer, but as the federal pot gets smaller in relationship to demand, agencies do have to look at other alternatives," says Hales. But BRT provides less rider capacity than light rail because buses can’t be coupled together like railcars. Nor it is as sexy.

But with separate stations, park-and-ride lots, special highway access ramps and dedicated lanes, BRT can lay the foundation for a future light rail system. That’s the case with Boston’s Silver Line BRT, where tunneling pumped the cost up to $800 million, says Brian Doyle, public transportation chairman for HNTB, Kansas City. Conversely, the 8-mile BRT-only system being completed in Kansas City costs a mere $12 million.

Whatever the mode, local funding and acceptance of a project often generates higher expectations–and inspires alternative project delivery to get them done faster. For example, the Dallas Area Rapid Transit agency is building a $2.5-billion, 49-mile light rail expansion with a construction manager/general contractor. "The CMGC is one step shy of a CM-at-risk," says Tim McKay, DART’s senior vice president of project management. HNTB’s Doyle notes that all potential risks are identified by contractor and owner in a certain period. Then the team offers a best and final price.

Private-public partnerships, once unheard of in mass transit projects, are becoming more prevalent, as exemplified by New Jersey’s Hudson-Bergen light rail line. The $2.2-billion design-build-operate-maintain project is now in its second phase. 21st Century Rail Corp., led by Washington Group International, plans to complete the 21 miles by 2010.

Portland’s transit agency, TriMet, was one of the first to get creative with funding. TriMet forged a public-private partnership to complete its $125-million, 5.5-mile airport extension, opened in 2001. Bechtel Corp. paid for 23%, purchased property along the extension and retained development rights. Lobbyists hope Congress will eventually eliminate restrictions on these types of contracts and even encourage them, says Ann Warner, a Bechtel vice president.

Lessons Learned

Gaining public buy-in and using alternative delivery methods don’t ensure success, as seen with Seattle’s troubled 14-mile monorail plan (ENR 8/1 p. 9). Local engineers and contractors have criticized its design and constructibility, but "monorail in Seattle was a terrific idea and still is," says Larry Shaw, Washington Group executive vice president. "They made a brave effort without relying on the federal government to succeed."

The $654-million, 4.2-mile Las Vegas monorail also has struggled for success. A spate of engineering and computer snags caused the line to close several times, costing its for-profit owners $9 million in lost revenue (ENR 2/14 p. 7). State-issued tax-free revenue bonds funded the project, with debt to be retired over 20 years from advertising and passenger fees. Granite Construction Co., Watsonville, Calif., led the design-build team on a $343-million, fixed-price 40-month contract.

Despite these snags, private developer Transit Systems Development LLC awarded another Granite-led team a tentative $336.6-million design-build-equip contract for a publicly funded $454-million, 2.25-mile-long extension. Pursuing this without federal funds isn’t feasible and issuing revenue bonds isn’t likely, says monorail spokesman Todd Walker.

Seattle’s Sound Transit learned some lessons about accountability and engineering in 2001. The estimated cost of its 21-mile Central Link light rail project grew from $2.4 billion to $4.2 billion, sparking voter outrage and jeopardizing a $500-million FTA grant (ENR 4/16/01 p. 16). The estimate was formulated with less than 1% of engineering completed, says Pierce County Executive John Ladenburg. The...