Crash Spotlights Smart Trains Issue
A fatal New York train derailment on Dec. 1 on a Metro-North Railroad commuter train, which appears to be the result of a lapse in the solo engineer's consciousness, has politicians demanding comprehensive, industry-wide implementation of positive train controls (PTC)—a step advocated by the National Transportation Safety Board for decades and one the rail industry already has been struggling to achieve.
In a Dec. 4 statement, American Public Transportation Association (APTA) President Michael Melaniphy said that, "as of June 2013, [U.S. commuter systems] have spent at least $458 million installing PTC. It is estimated that the cost of full implementation of PTC will be at least $2.75 billion. To date, Congress hasappropriated $50 million for PTC."
Moreover, "APTA has asked the Federal Communications Commission to provide free radio spectrum," which is required for PTC-related communication between trains and signal towers, he added.
In the meantime, Metro-North Railroad says it is moving quickly to improve safety at critical curves and movable bridges at the behest of New York State Gov. Andrew Cuomo (D) and the Federal Railroad Administration. "Two-thirds of Metro-North's operating fleet is equipped with alerter devices in the engineer's position to ensure engineers remain attentive, and the remaining one-third is equipped with dead man's controls," the railroad said in a release. "Within the next year, all equipment without alerters will be either retrofitted to include them or replaced with new equipment that includes alerters."
Other measures include reducing maximum speeds at 26 sites and increased compliance monitoring via event data recorders and various radar-gun locations, the railroad said. Engineers will no longer be solo in the cab.
It is very poor "human factors" "engineering" to give or not give speed restriction signals depending on if the train is approaching the sharp curve from the south - sound the warning s...
While what impelled the train driver's inaction may never be fully satisfactorily known, it is a no no to have a signal system like this.
Far better to have no aural warning system than to have an unreliable one.
It is ironic that this unreliable signal system violates the key concept of traditional railroad design philosophy. It is best for a system to "fail safe". In its implementation of the "fail safe" philosophy here, the signal would be given even tho the curve was not coming up. Instead no aural signal was given even tho the curve was coming up.
Monitoring the train driver as an interim measure may actually be less safe than having the train driver operate solo ( together with the other immediate measures being taken) for there will be lessened vigilance. However it is reassuring to the public so I would agree on this measure.
This fact was dramatically shown by the recent NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board ) hearing on the crash of a Korean Aircraft at San Francisco Airport.
There were 3 people in the cockpit monitoring the approach moreover visibility was excellent but the autopilot was giving a conspicious visual signal that it was disengaged and this signal was not picked up by anyone.
As for the "wisdom" of indifferently sounding a warning when a sharp curve is approached at speed see 1 Corinthians Chapter 14 (Kings James Version).<br/><br/>"For if the trumpet give...
"For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?"
